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INTRODUCTION
What Works in Economic Development reviews evaluation literature relevant to economic
development strategies. While economic development programs are difficult to evaluate, the
literature reveals important information about the level of success achieved by various programs.
It also demonstrates how positive results can be realized. A “what works” matrix follows the
review of the evaluation studies. The matrix highlights the significant findings and key lessons
that can be learned from this work.
In determining “what works” in economic development, a number of factors must be considered.
First and foremost, what are the criteria by which economic development programs are to be
judged? Is the goal to reveal whether the program has been implemented as intended or is the
goal to assess the impact of the program?
An important distinction has been made between process evaluations and impact evaluations.
Process evaluations focus on how a program is delivered; impact evaluations focus on program
results (Bartik & Bingham 1997). The vast majority of economic development evaluations
examine process. While they can be useful in helping to avoid problems in program
implementation, they offer little in the way of measuring program success.
The tendency toward process evaluations largely springs from the difficulty of conducting
impact evaluations. Establishing appropriate measures can be difficult in an evaluation, but may
be particularly challenging when assessing the effectiveness of economic development programs.
To determine program effectiveness requires the ability to distinguish between changes due to
the program and those due to factors unrelated to the program (Bartik and Bingham 1997).
Establishing causal links is clearly a difficult task. It is also impossible to determine what might
have occurred had the program not been initiated. Furthermore, it may be difficult to determine
the appropriate time frame or geographic scope at which to assess the program.
The results of many economic development programs may not be immediately apparent. At
what point should program effectiveness be assessed? Geography offers a similar dilemma. For
example, should a work force development strategy be assessed according to its impact on
regional labor force patterns or in terms of its ability to affect the distribution of employment
within the region?
The goals of the program must always be kept in mind. According to Bartik and Bingham,
“most economic development programs are so small relative to the community, any impact will
be difficult to detect, but the impact may be large relative to the size of the program” (Bartik &
Bingham 1997).
Some evaluators have focused on cost-benefit analyses to determine program effectiveness.
Cost-benefit analysis is intended to show whether program benefits outweigh the costs of
delivering the program. The advantage of this approach is that it addresses the issue of
efficiency. The fact that program goals have been met does not necessarily mean the program
was worthwhile.
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Whether the project accomplished what leaders wanted it to accomplish, even if it did not make
money (Pagano & Bowman), is often the measure of success. Cost benefit does not escape the
problems of outcome evaluations, however. Evaluators must apply a monetary value to program
benefits in order to conduct such an analysis. As if this were not a great enough challenge,
determining program costs is also not a straightforward task. Cost to whom and benefit to
whom?
In response to some of these issues, researchers have begun exploring the usefulness of new
methods of evaluation being developed in other academic fields, such as the theory of change
approach. The theory of change, which has attracted a great deal of attention, was first developed
in an effort to establish better ways of assessing comprehensive community initiatives. It has
been defined as “a systematic and cumulative study of the links between activities, outcomes and
contexts of the initiative” (Connell & Kubish 1998).
This requires determining the intended outcomes, the activities implemented to achieve those
outcomes, and the contextual factors that may have an effect on those activities and their ability
to achieve the outcomes. The theory of change approach is appealing to some in the field of
economic development because economic development programs share some of the same
complexities as comprehensive community initiatives. While the approach does not totally
eliminate the problems associated with establishing causal arguments, it is believed to reduce
these problems by stating up front how activities are expected to lead to long-term outcomes.
Evaluation of economic development programs is still fairly limited. In addition to the
methodological issues, political issues are involved. There is often fear that negative findings
will have political consequences for those who have supported funding for the program.
Economic development is practiced in a politically charged atmosphere with limited resources, a
situation that can discourage honest evaluation.
When reviewing the findings of program evaluations, it is important to keep in mind the issues
described above. However, another caution is worthy of mention. While program evaluation is
important to understanding the value of different economic development practices, it is essential
to remember the role of local context. What works in one area may not work in another. Each
economic region has its own opportunities and its own constraints. This should always be kept
in mind when assessing or developing economic development strategies.
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CHAPTER ONE: LAND
Revitalizing commercial districts or identifying development opportunities for vacant or
underutilized land has been a key strategy for fostering economic growth. Real estate
development projects often require significant financial resources and have long-term impact on
the physical development of a region. This underscores the importance of understanding the
effectiveness of property development strategies in enhancing regional wealth. The following
section provides an overview of evaluation studies that focus on economic development
strategies intended to affect land markets.
MARKET-RATE HOUSING
Simons and Sharkey (1997) have analyzed subsidizing new inner city housing in Cleveland,
Ohio. The subsidy programs support both affordable and market-rate housing. The researchers
focus on the fiscal costs and benefits to the city and assess the effectiveness of subsidy programs
by examining 10 new housing projects started between 1990 and 1993. Costs include expenses
for preparing lots, making infrastructure improvements, granting property tax abatements and
offering financial incentives to facilitate purchase. Benefits include increased property taxes (in
the long run), indirect property tax increases from neighboring properties, income tax revenue
from new residents and income tax from construction jobs.
In their sample, they found an overall cost-benefit ratio of 2:1. While this suggests that housing
subsidies are not economically efficient, the authors recognize that the cost-benefit ratio excludes
many important non-quantifiable or intangible benefits (e.g., benefits of homeownership to
residents and neighbors, removal of blight), as well as positive effects on neighboring
jurisdictions.
While the level of support extended by the city did not appear to be sustainable in the long run,
the subsidy programs did appear to succeed in generating new housing starts, which was the
desired outcome. The researchers argue that the cost-benefit ratio of new construction should be
compared with that of older housing unit rehabilitation to determine which approach is more
efficient.
However, they acknowledge that the political benefits of rehabilitation often do not match those
associated with new construction. They also recommend that policy makers weigh the political
and fiscal advantages of attracting middle-income residents back into the central city by
supporting market-rate housing rather than upgrading the housing of existing residents.
BUSINESS SITE LOCATIONS
Weisbrod and Pollakowski (1984) examined how downtown improvement efforts affected the
entry, growth and exit of retail and service establishments in those areas. They studied eight
downtown revitalization projects that reflected geographic diversity and a range of city sizes
from medium to large. Downtown improvement projects are generally intended to stimulate the
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revitalization of declining retail districts; they rely heavily on improvements in physical
amenities and aesthetic image to increase the attractiveness of the downtown shopping district.
The researchers measured differences in establishment profile and growth trends between the
downtown improvement zone, the rest of the central business district and other retail districts in
the central city. They found significant variation in the impact of the projects, ranging from
large increases in new entry and growth of existing establishments to a continuation of trends of
establishments leaving the area.
They determined that variation in retail and service activity reflected the health of the local
metropolitan economy and the relative importance of the central business district as a
commercial center. However, they found no evidence that areas that had experienced growth in
retail and service activity did so at the expense of other nearby retail areas. They also found that
improvement projects tended to affect establishment entry more than it affected the growth of
existing establishments.
Weisbrod and Pollakowski concluded that the most successful projects included coordination of
sponsored activities and promotions, improvements in transit services, trash collection, street and
sidewalk maintenance, but stopped short of a complete ban on vehicular traffic. The less
successful strategies relied on the physical-design strategy of building a pedestrian mall without
specific strategies for sponsored activities, promotions and improving auto or transit
accessibility.
A report issued by the Brookings Institution (Murphy 1998) documents the 15-year experience
of Cleveland’s MidTown initiative, a private-sector-driven effort to stimulate reinvestment in an
inner city commercial and industrial district. The city’s midtown corridor was characterized by
serious physical decline and social problems.
After a six-month feasibility study, 46 corporate, small business and institutional leaders in the
immediate area made the decision to incorporate. Their goal was to address issues of security,
neighborhood appearance, public image, productive uses of land and buildings and development
of a cohesive business community.
MidTown Cleveland defined an agenda for physical development and sought state and federal
grants and loans for a land-banking project that would make central city brownfields more
competitive with suburban greenfields. They participated in a Job Match program to help make
the link between residents and jobs and they adopted a marketing strategy to change the public
perception of the area.
Between 1983 and 1997, the midtown corridor experienced an increase in assessed values in
commercial (55 percent) and industrial (47 percent) real estate that far exceeded that of the city,
the central county and suburban counties. There was also evidence of a rise in reinvestment
activity that included 425 new companies; 400 expansion, renovation, new construction or
expansion projects; 6,000 jobs retained due to expansion, substantial capital investment and/or
relocation of existing companies within MidTown; and 5,500 new jobs gained from expansion
and/or relocation.
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Several lessons were learned from the MidTown experience: the private sector can mobilize its
economic power to increase the competitive advantage of inner cities; the private sector can help
shape a competitive market environment by changing both the perception and reality of safety; to
be competitive, central business areas must be safe, clean, green and outfitted with updated
infrastructure; competitiveness strategies must include consistent, sophisticated public relations
and marketing programs to promote the advantages and products of an inner-city location;
reinvestment successes bring increasing demand for shrinking supplies of marketable land and
buildings, and some inner-city areas are surprisingly rich with employment opportunities.
Lugar and Goldstein (1990) studied the impact of research parks on regional economic
development. They conducted a case study of North Carolina’s Research Triangle Park (RTP) as
well as a broader examination of research parks across the country.
For the RTP case study, the researchers surveyed businesses in the park vicinity after the park
was created. For those who located outside the park, 41 percent reported that the presence of
RTP was of high or moderate importance to their location decision, but 59 percent said it was of
minor or no importance. One-third of those who located within RTP said it was unlikely or very
unlikely they would have located in the region had the park not existed; however, 44 percent said
the opposite was true. Those who reported that they would have located in the region even if the
park were not there cited the proximity of the three research universities as being key to their
location decision.
The researchers concluded that the park has been responsible for a considerable amount of
technology-related employment in the region, but that park-induced growth accounted for less
than 25 percent of the overall employment growth in technology-related businesses. They
reasoned that the primary engine of economic development in the region has not been the park
itself, but the three research universities.
Lugar and Goldstein’s broader analysis compared employment growth rates in counties with
research parks to employment growth rates in counties without research parks but with the same
metropolitan status and population size and within the same census region. They found that half
of all research park start-ups failed as real estate ventures. Half of those that remained were
converted from research to more general business parks. While this may have turned them into
successful real estate ventures, it did not meet the original goal, which was to attract research and
development activity. Furthermore, of the parks that remain in existence, only about half were
considered successful if judged on their ability to create jobs that otherwise would not have
existed.
Fitzgerald and Green Leigh (2002) studied various economic development strategies across the
country. While their work focuses on “best practices” rather than formal program evaluation,
they offer several key lessons for economic developers dealing with different aspects of real
estate development.
Many central cities and older suburbs are plagued by an abundance of underutilized, aging office
and industrial buildings, dying commercial corridors, and brownfield sites. Fitzgerald and Green
Leigh suggest that economic developers take advantage of the growing interest in downtown
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living and adapt former office or industrial sites into residential units. They also advise
upgrading the information technology infrastructure of older buildings as a means for attracting
new businesses.
They cite the importance of addressing contamination issues associated with industrial sites and
note that older, centralized warehouse space may be attractive to firms relying on rail or small
transport vehicles.
With respect to revitalizing commercial corridors, Fitzgerald and Green Leigh recommend that
any effort should begin with a market analysis that assesses what retail goods and services the
community needs and can support. They believe that grassroots endorsement and community
building are essential and that efforts must involve the area’s existing merchants. They point out
that older commercial districts may not attract traditional anchors, but economic developers can
seek out alternative anchors to bring people back to the area, such as government service offices,
cultural or recreational centers or churches.
Having said this, they acknowledge that traditional big box retailers may recognize untapped
retail potential and be willing to consider design alternatives that will accommodate the older
commercial space. Finally, Fitzgerald and Green Leigh offer important advice to economic
developers involved in brownfield recovery. They stress the importance of understanding the
pattern and extent of a community’s brownfield problem, which requires inventorying and
mapping all sites. They caution against cleaning up only those sites that are in the most
marketable sections of the community, as this may help to widen inequalities.
They also underscore the importance of evaluating where the private sector will take the
initiative and how public programs and incentives will encourage that initiative. They suggest
that communities offer incentives for non-brownfield related development costs, since many
brownfield sites suffer from other problems, such as lack of infrastructure and community
services.
Fitzgerald and Green Leigh believe there are five primary barriers to brownfield redevelopment
(liability, information gaps, costs, time and uncertainty) and that a successful program will
minimize these barriers. One-stop business centers that package efforts to reduce these barriers
can be a useful tool.
PHYSICAL AMENITIES
Convention centers, sports stadiums, museums and similar attractions intended to attract tourists
and capture disposable income have gained increasing popularity as economic development
strategies. Fenich (1994) conducted an analysis to determine the effectiveness of New York
City’s Jacob Javits Convention Center as an economic development tool.
When the Javits Center was proposed, proponents argued that a new facility was needed to
maintain or improve the city’s comparative advantage in attracting conventioneers; they said the
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center would serve as a tool for economic revitalization. The Javits Center replaced the
Coliseum, which provided convention space until the new facility was built.
Fenich’s analysis determined that the Javits Center has attracted more than 1.5 million out-oftown convention attendees each year and has hosted local events that have served about an equal
number of people. The Center stimulates over $1 billion in direct spending by attendees, with a
total economic impact of over $2 billion annually. The state and local taxes generated more than
offset the operating costs and debt service, yielding net fiscal benefits, but only if the Coliseum is
not considered in the equation.
If the revenue generated by the previous facility were factored into the equation (revenue that
was generated without the additional expense of building a new facility), the Javits Center’s
revenues did not cover its expenses. Furthermore, the Javits Center did not lead to physical
revitalization in the immediate area. Fenich found no evidence of spin-off development.
American cities have gone on a building boom of sports stadiums in recent years. This trend has
swept cities large and small, as they have sought to attract or retain both major and minor league
teams and other sporting events.
Rosentraub, Swindell, Przybylski, and Mullins (1994) studied the impact of Indianapolis’ sports
and downtown development strategy. The city adopted an economic development strategy that
relied heavily on sports and invested very large sums of money to build new facilities. The
research team found Indianapolis’ focus on its downtown and sports as a development strategy
was associated with a general trend of increased employment and economic growth.
However, the strategy did not bring more growth than was experienced by other Midwestern
communities and did not lead to a concentration of higher paying jobs in the region. Downtown
employment stabilized, but this could be partially attributed to expansion of the university and
public sector. Furthermore, the trend toward job development in areas outside the downtown
center continued. Despite the large investment, there was an inconsequential effect on economic
growth.
Keys to successful land development strategies
Real estate development projects are primary components of many broader economic
development strategies. Central cities and older suburbs, in particular, struggle with ways to
redevelop or revitalize their residential, commercial and industrial landscape. A few common
themes can be drawn from the evaluation literature. Whether dealing with commercial district
revitalization, brownfield redevelopment or residential construction, it is important to have a
thorough understanding of the opportunities and constraints relevant to the entire community as
well as specific sites.
Economic developers should not limit their ideas to traditional land uses, but look to alternative
solutions. It is important to create a clean environment where people feel safe and a variety of
amenities are available. When considering large-scale projects such as sports or recreation
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facilities or cultural attractions, planners must recognize the possibility of substitution effects. If
one activity simply draws resources from another activity in the region, no wealth has been
generated.
Attractions must be able to draw visitors from outside the region to truly result in economic
development. Finally, in assessing the effectiveness of land development strategies, many
benefits may not be quantifiable. Intangible benefits such as improvements in the general
appearance of a neighborhood and increased community pride may not be measurable impacts, at
least in the short-term.
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CHAPTER TWO: LABOR
Despite the considerable resources directed toward work force development, evaluation of work
force development programs has been limited in scope. Program assessment most often has
focused on lessons that can be learned from the experiences of those administering work force
programs, rather than employment and earnings outcomes for program participants or regions.
This section highlights the findings of those studies that have sought to measure outcomes,
followed by a discussion of the more general “lessons learned” in implementing work force
development strategies.
OCCUPATION OR INDUSTRY SPECIFIC TRAINING
The effectiveness of school-to-work programs and similar intervention strategies has been
studied to a greater extent than many others, perhaps due to the influx of federal funds that
followed the passage of the School-to-Work Opportunities Act in 1994. Findings indicate that
these programs have had many positive results, although there are areas in which outcomes could
be improved.
The degree of success has varied, but the impact on the employment and earnings of participants
has been positive in most cases. There is also evidence to suggest that participation in school-towork programs leads to improvements in academic achievement. It should be noted that federal
funds are no longer used to support school-to-work initiatives. It was intended only as seed
money to help establish programs.
An evaluation of The National Job Corps program (Burghardt, et al., 2001) made a “meaningful
difference” in the educational attainment and earnings of participants, according to an evaluation
(Burghardt, et al., 2001). Employment and earnings gains were found across most groups of
students and types of settings. Furthermore, it was shown that participants in the program were
less likely to commit crimes or be the victim of crimes and were less likely to receive public
assistance.
A cost-benefit analysis determined that the program was cost effective, despite high initial costs.
It was acknowledged that the cost benefits were modest, but it was believed that benefits would
continue into the future and that the limited time frame of the study could not reveal this trend.
Another study based on focus groups with school-to-work program participants echoed these
positive findings (Hollenbeck, 1996a). The study found that school-to-work programs
stimulated student interest in occupations and that students made useful employer contacts.
Participants also learned skills useful for future education and career plans, even though they
might not enter the specific occupations of the programs in which they were enrolled. Finally,
programs encouraged planning for postsecondary training by some students not originally
headed in that direction. Despite the success, some barriers that obstructed school-to-work
programs were identified. Operating as a worksite for students involved costs and getting
postsecondary institutions involved in the programs had difficulties.
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A review of high school career academies in one large, urban school district also found positive
outcomes in academic achievement; however, outcomes on employment and earnings were less
identifiable (Maxwell & Rubin 2001). The career academy is a “school-within-a-school” that
coordinates curriculum and activities around a single occupation or industry. Based on a study
of 10,000 students, researchers found that, relative to a comparison group, program participants
showed an increase in grade point average, lower dropout rates and a greater likelihood to attend
postsecondary education.
Findings indicated that a network of social support leads to better educational outcomes.
However, with respect to employment or wages, participants fared no better in the period
immediately following high school. Academic achievement was credited to several factors,
including a relatively complete curriculum offered to students; an environment that sheltered
students from hostile or indifferent school environments and a social support system of teachers
and peers; program leaders with commitment and energy that inspired teachers and students, and
support from the school and community.
An evaluation of the Manufacturing Technology Partnership (MTP) program in Flint, Mich.,
found improvements in both academic and employment outcomes (Hollenbeck 1996b). MTP
originated as a pre-apprenticeship program but evolved into a more general school-to-work
program that prepares young people for careers in manufacturing.
Students who participated in the program had higher grade point averages and higher-class ranks
than students in a comparison group; absences were reduced among participants. Students also
had advantages in employment rates, wage rates and average hours worked. Additionally, it
appeared that the program’s impacts might be greater after several years. Program success was
attributed to the effective implementation of a dynamic curriculum that integrated vocational and
academic skills.
In addition to the more formal evaluations of school-to-work programs, anecdotal evidence
contributes to the knowledge of what makes a program successful. Based on an analysis of
school-to-work programs in Boston, Tulsa and Pennsylvania, researchers offered several
guidelines for securing the employer participation that has been recognized as a difficult
component of these programs (Flynn 1994).
They suggest targeting employers who are predisposed to participate in school-to-work
programs; identifying a private sector “champion” to recruit other employers; emphasizing that
school-to-work programs serve corporate and community goals; and concentrating on industries
experiencing or anticipating skill shortages; that are operating in international markets or in
markets with fast changing customer demands; that value and have a history of community
involvement, and industries with a culture of education and training.
A study conducted by a researcher at the Urban Institute (Lerman 2000) also conveys valuable
lessons about school-to-work programs based on the experiences of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD, an international organization,
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helps prepare youth for careers by emphasizing academic standards and efforts to strengthen the
schooling-career connection.
Findings suggested that close institutional links between industries and schools are critical to
align incentives for employers and youth. Employers are encouraged to hire and train students in
career-oriented positions while students are encouraged to do well in school. The local labor
market must be understood so as to target the jobs and careers with the most potential for growth
and advancement.
Developing an appropriate mix of academic education with occupational skills and work-based
learning is equally important to ensure that the intensity of the academic and vocational
education is appropriate to the jobs targeted. Other important elements identified were the
provision of supportive services (such as child care, counseling and placement services) and soft
skills training.
While school-to-work programs have taken a prominent position in the work force evaluation
literature, other assessments have been conducted. The Ohio Department of Education
commissioned a study to assess the impact of the various work force development programs
administered by the agency (Hollenbeck & Anderson 1993). Most programs are targeted toward
adults and lead to a vocational certificate or occupational license.
Surveys determined that most participants complete their program in less than a year and most
find jobs. Over 80 percent of the participants were in the labor force at the time of the survey
and about 75 percent were employed. Training programs resulted in higher labor force
participation for men and higher wages for women. An area of concern was that only 60 percent
of the employed participants were in jobs related to their training.
Community colleges play an important role in providing education and training. A study of the
impact of community college schooling on displaced workers in Pennsylvania and Washington
analyzed data from unemployment insurance earnings records and college transcripts (Jacobson,
LaLonde & Sullivan 2001). Data indicated that a year of schooling raised long-term earnings of
displaced workers by 5 percent.
While this was a significant difference, it was not as much as had been predicted. More than half
of the gain resulted from the impact of schooling on hours worked. There also was considerable
variation in the returns (in terms of wage increases) associated with different types of courses.
Skills acquired from more technically oriented vocational and academic math and science
courses have very large returns, whereas most other types of courses are associated with zero or
sometimes negative returns.
The National Governor’s Association Center for Best Practices (2001) assessed the effectiveness
of Regional Skill Partnerships in addressing skill shortages and promoting job retention and
career advancement for low-income workers. Regional Skill Partnerships are consortia of firms,
educational institutions and other community partners that tackle common problems facing a
targeted industry in a region.
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The study did not measure outcomes for program participants, but did offer lessons for program
implementation. The lessons included: using sound labor market and economic analysis as the
basis for identifying target industries and employers; avoiding duplication of the functions of
existing community institutions; supporting industry partnership with strong staff capacity, and
building partnerships where there has been prior collaboration among firms within an industry.
Grubb (1995) reviewed evaluations of several job-training programs initiated by the federal
government over time. Based on this review, he determined that “A large number of job-training
programs lead to increased earnings, and the benefits generally outweigh the costs – though the
increases in earnings are moderate by almost any standards, insufficient to lift those enrolled in
such programs out of poverty.”
He also noted that the benefits of these job-training programs fade out after four to five years
because they rarely put individuals in career paths that lead to continued earnings increases (as
formal schooling does). Programs have tended to provide greater benefits for women than men,
and programs for youths have been largely ineffective (with the exception of very intensive
programs like Job Corps).
Grubb found the results from nearly 30 years of evaluation to be surprisingly similar, particularly
given the variation in the kinds of programs that had been studied and the methods used. His
broad conclusion was discouraging: “…thirty years of experimentation with job-training
programs have created a substantial number of programs whose benefits – for individuals in dire
need of employment and economic independence – are quite trivial, and are completely
inadequate to the task of moving them out of poverty, off of welfare, or into stable employment
over the long run.”
In an effort to provide guidance in program improvement, Grubb offered several possible
explanations for the meager impact of job-training programs:
1) Most job-training programs are small – they last a very short time and often deliver a single
kind of service rather than a variety of complementary services. 2) Basic strategy has stressed
moving individuals into employment quickly. The underlying assumption is that an unemployed
person’s basic problem is to find a job and then will remain employed. 3) There is little or no
explicit training going on in many on-the-job training programs – employers view programs as a
source of subsidized labor and use individuals in routine, unskilled work. 4) Programs often
suffer from bad instruction – job-training programs often use techniques based on “skills and
drills.” Instructors break reading, writing and mathematical skills into tiny sub-skills and then
endlessly drill a series of inherently meaningless sub-skills. 5) Training programs are vulnerable
to political interference. This usually operates to direct funds to particular service providers,
regardless of whether they are effective or not. As a result, local programs have difficulty
shifting resources from ineffective to more effective providers. 6) Job-training programs have
not done a good job of placement – they either have low placement rates or do not place
individuals in appropriate jobs. 7) Job-training programs enroll individuals with substantial
barriers to employment and deliver relatively limited training; therefore they aim to place
individuals in jobs with relatively low levels of skill and pay. This may reflect realistic
expectations, but does little to help move people out of poverty or off welfare. 8) There are not
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enough jobs for unskilled or semi-skilled workers and the labor market is unable to absorb all
those who complete training programs. 9) Many employers will not hire young people. 10)
Those who fail to use the educational system to increase their skills and gain access to
employment are, by definition, those with such serious intellectual, personal and motivational
barriers to employment that no “second chance” system of reasonable cost could possibly help
them attain stable employment.
Grubb stressed the importance of connecting job-training programs to other training and
education opportunities; he advocates combining demand-side policy with supply-side policy to
help reduce barriers that originate from the market.
Conclusions reached by Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins (1997) echo those presented by
Grubb. Like Grubb, they reviewed previous studies of government training programs and
concluded, “The broadest generalization about the current knowledge of government training
programs for the disadvantaged is that they have produced modest positive effects on
employment and earnings for adult men and women that are roughly commensurate with the
modest amount of resources expended on them. The positive effects for adults are not large
enough to produce major aggregate effects on employment and earnings among low-income
target groups, and the programs have not made substantial inroads in reducing poverty, income
inequality, or welfare use. Moreover, they have failed to produce positive effects for youth.”
The researchers submitted that most of the information about the effectiveness of government
training programs concerns their costs and short-term financial effects on participants. However,
there is considerable uncertainty about the kinds of training that works best, the effectiveness of
training for certain demographic groups and the appropriate policies to improve outcomes.
Leahy (2001) investigated whether certain components of job-training programs positively affect
the employment outcomes of women who had experience with Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC). Her study included a treatment group comprised of women who had received
welfare-sponsored, government-funded job training, and a control group comprised of women
who were comparable to those in the treatment group, but did not receive job training.
Leahy found that, overall, job training had little or no significant effect on a disadvantaged
woman’s probability of working; however, specific characteristics of job training did have some
effect. Women who had received more than one type of training were better prepared for fulltime work, while women who received only one component of training (such as basic education)
were less prepared.
Structural and contextual factors had important effects, particularly for part-time workers.
Community-level variables such as unemployment rate and region and metropolitan residence
had a greater effect on transitions to part-time work than full-time work. Positive outcomes of
job-training programs included higher wages for both full-time and part-time workers. Leahy
stresses that helping disadvantaged women requires micro-level as well as macro-level
intervention. Macro-level interventions include policies that encourage employers, communities
and local governments to increase occupational and educational opportunities and effective
welfare systems.
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Chapple (forthcoming) relied on in-depth interviews to examine why job histories varied among
women welfare recipients. She focused on how the use of social contacts reinforces and
reproduces inequality for low-income women. Chapple found that supply-side factors,
particularly educational attainment, work experience and the age at which a woman had her first
child, shape the type of job pursued, the search method selected and the extent of career
orientation.
She determined that the most useful type of resource networks are wide acquaintanceship
networks from work and school that tend to emerge from, rather than precede, human capital
development. Women who were chronically unemployed or changed jobs and occupations
frequently were connected to the labor market through social contacts, but often failed to obtain
education or develop a career.
Chapple concluded that their social contacts failed to lead to consistent or promising jobs, and
the very existence of these contacts kept them in the secondary labor market and often left them
unemployed. The most effective contact networks were those that resulted from developing
human capital through education and work experience. Career-oriented women tended to engage
in a process of working, network building and learning. Chapple believes that demand-side
policies (such as subsidies to increase wages) may be more effective for job-mobile women than
training.
Keys to successful labor force development strategies
If the goal of work force training programs is to improve the quality and skill sets of individuals,
to place them in jobs and to help businesses find an employee base in line with their needs, then
a good work force program must balance the needs of individuals and businesses (International
Economic Development Council).
In trying to determine the effectiveness of labor force development programs that seek to
improve the supply of workers, it is important to note that success varies with different
population groups. Some programs have been effective in improving opportunities for women
who are re-entering the work force, but have negligible effects for men. Similarly, some
programs have shown positive results for incumbent workers but not new entrants.
Target groups must be carefully considered when implementing a labor force development
strategy. Labor force development programs that focus on the demand side of the equation must
recognize that the demand for labor is directly tied to the demand for products. Just as supplyside programs must consider the needs of the local work force, demand-side programs must
understand the needs of local industry. Effective labor force development programs will
illustrate an understanding of both supply and demand.
Some labor economists have shown concern that the emphasis on labor-supply programs (those
centered on improving the skills of workers) can come at the expense of efforts to increase labor
demand. Bartik has demonstrated that focusing on the supply-side is a limiting approach,
particularly if the goal is to increase the employment opportunities of the poor. It is difficult or
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expensive to create large enough increases in the employment of poor persons to make a real
impact on poverty; such programs can create displacement effects if demand does not rise with
supply (Bartik 2001).
The importance of establishing a balance between labor-supply and labor-demand programs
underscores the significance of local context in developing and implementing an effective
intervention strategy.
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CHAPTER THREE: CAPITAL
Numerous finance programs have been created to help businesses obtain the capital needed for
start-up or expansion. These programs seek to provide financing when conventional lending
markets fail to meet the needs of firms. This often occurs because the terms are unmanageable
for the firms or the risk is too high for the lending institutions. The ultimate goal of capital
finance programs is to increase business activity, thereby providing jobs and additional tax
revenue. Evaluation studies of several types of capital finance programs are reviewed in the
follow section.
FINANCE
Wiewel (1991) conducted a study commissioned by The Illinois Development Finance Authority
(IDFA) to provide information on its role and impact on economic development in the state
through the issuance of Industrial Revenue Bonds (IRBs). IRBs offer low-cost financing to
businesses that want to establish themselves or to expand. The University of Illinois at Chicago
Center for Urban Economic Development completed the study in 1991 after conducting
interviews with a sample of IRB recipients.
Several key findings were highlighted: 1) job growth occurred at a respectable pace, with an
average employment expansion of 48 percent since receiving the IRB; 2) IRB recipient firms
reported increasing profitability – 54 percent said they were more profitable after receiving the
IRB and 68 percent reported profit rates at or above industry norms; 3) 45 percent of the
employment growth experienced by IRB companies included high wage, professional and skilled
occupations; 4) minorities and women constituted a large proportion of the work force of IRB
recipients; 5) IRB companies were large purchasers of goods and services supplied in the state;
6) industrial lease space had the greatest concentrated development impact, and 7) qualitative
responses indicated a general satisfaction with the IRB program.
Florida and Smith (1990) conducted a two-year study to explore the role of venture capital in
technological innovation and economic development. They compiled a database on the venture
capital industry based on information reported in the Venture Capital Journal over a four-year
period. This data was used to conduct analyses of investment flows and co-investment patterns
at the local, regional and national levels and to develop statistical measures of the relationship
between venture capital and high technology development.
Researchers also did extensive fieldwork to talk with people involved in the venture capital
industry and to study the history of the industry. They summarized the major findings of their
research in five key points about venture capital: 1) it is extremely concentrated; 2) it is bicoastal
in the Northeast and Pacific regions; 3) its investments flow mainly to established hightechnology centers; 4) its impact is context sensitive: In areas with an established hightechnology base, venture capital fuels the growth of that sector; in areas without such a base,
venture capital alone is not likely to stimulate innovation and high-technology development; 5)
public policies must recognize that venture capital is only one element of an area’s technology
base or social structure of innovation.
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Based on their findings, Florida and Smith question the role of government involvement in
venture capital funds. There is a high failure rate associated with venture investing and the risk
may prove too great for public agencies. More importantly, they believe their findings contradict
the assumption that underlies public involvement in venture capital funds. They did not find
gaps in the supply of venture capital due to imperfect markets and determined that venture
capitalists were very adept at finding investment opportunities.
Finally, they state that venture capital is just one of many necessary inputs to technologyintensive economic development. They point to literature that supports the contention that only a
limited number of regions have the attributes needed to generate and sustain a high level of hightechnology-based economic growth. Florida and Smith assert that increasing the volume of
venture capital in areas that lack other necessary inputs is unlikely to have any significant effect
on their technological capabilities.
The St. Louis Regional Commerce and Growth Association commissioned a study to explore the
importance of locally managed venture capital funds in boosting the number of new business
ventures in the area. Consultants reviewed the performance of three locally-managed funds and
found strong evidence that they played an important role in financing new business formations
and expansions in the region. Moreover, the funds were willing to provide financing when funds
managed elsewhere were not (Susman 1986).
They found that in St. Louis and other regions, venture capital funds tend to emphasize the major
strengths and predominant objectives of companies and institutions located in specific areas.
They assert that the importance of locally managed venture capital funds to new business
formations and expansions cannot be overstated.
The Capital Access Program (CAP) was designed and adopted by Michigan in 1986. CAP
provides banks with a partial loan loss reserve to absorb higher risks associated with many
business loans while staying in compliance with bank regulation. Because of the loss protection,
banks can absorb up to nine times the default risk of conventional loans and still be covered
against the loss. This has allowed banks significantly to expand their commercial lending
activities.
Researchers identified several common characteristics of firms that received CAP loans: most
were less than five years old (about 20 percent were start-ups); most had already incurred
substantial debt; most were small firms that required less than $100,000 in financing and had
demonstrated managerial competence in overcoming challenges, and most provided collateral
that was less than required for a conventional loan. The CAP program was shown to be
particularly effective in helping new, small firms obtain financing (Laughlin & Digirolamo
1994).
Dunlap, Burkhalter, Watson, and Fitzpatrick (1995) conducted a case study of Auburn,
Alabama’s Revolving Loan Fund (RLF) to determine what is involved in operating a successful
RLF program. At the time of the study, there were six components to Auburn’s program: 1)
loan guarantee, designed primarily for small businesses; 2) fixed asset direct loan, designed for
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larger commercial and industrial projects; 3) infrastructure development program guarantee, to
enable developers to receive assistance in attaining utility services; 4) working capital loan, also
for small businesses; 5) interim loan, to support economic development projects during start-up,
and 6) housing development, for affordable housing in targeted neighborhoods.
The RLF programs were evaluated on jobs created and retained, economic viability, tax benefits,
leverage ratio and availability of funds. The research team determined that the programs had
successfully promoted job development and that a significant number had gone to individuals
from low- to moderate-income households.
Assessments of economic viability proved sound – there were no defaults on loans from RLFs.
They estimated a tax impact of nearly $150,000 annually and found that the leverage ratio
(public dollars invested to private dollars invested) ranged from 1:3.18 to 1:5.36. Finally it
appeared that the city’s professional staff made sound investment decisions that ensured fund
availability.
The research team identified five basic guidelines for local governments to follow to reduce
financial risk in RLF programs: 1) avoid being the sole investor; 2) ensure that the private
sector’s investment exceeds its own; 3) secure as much collateral as possible; 4) use sound
business principles, and 5) isolate the decision-making process for assessing the value of a deal
from political interests.
Bradshaw (forthcoming) studied the California State Loan Guarantee Program (SLGP), a
program designed to help businesses that nearly qualify for bank loans (but do not) obtain credit
and expand employment and economic activity in the state, particularly in disadvantaged areas.
The SLGP guarantees up to 90 percent of the loan, but the guarantee may not exceed $350,000.
Because the loan is not fully guaranteed, banks assume some risk and therefore will not loan to
businesses at high risk of default. Bradshaw evaluated changes in employment and economic
activity by examining firms before and after they received the loans.
In an attempt to be conservative and not overestimate the effects of the program, the analysis was
limited to employment change reported while the firm had an active loan. Changes after the loan
was repaid were not considered. Findings indicated that firms with loan guarantees expanded
employment and paid taxes while experiencing a default rate of less than 2 percent. This
occurred during a period of economic recession for the state.
Firms also retained employees who might have been laid off if not for the loan. The program
cost the state approximately $3,000 per job; tax revenues generated by firms exceeded program
costs. Firms with loan guarantees generated more than double the number of jobs than
comparable firms in the state. Bradshaw concluded that loan guarantees are a cost-effective tool
to support small business expansion and retention.
Servon (1997) conducted a case study of microenterprise programs operating in three inner city
areas. The Women’s Initiative for Self Employment (WISE) serves low- and moderate-income
women in the San Francisco/Oakland area; Working Capital in Boston targets specific
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communities, but not specific populations; and Accion New York is based in Brooklyn and
targets the Latino population.
Servon writes that microenterprise programs have developed based on the recognition that selfemployment is an increasingly important segment of the economy, particularly for groups with
restricted ability to participate in the mainstream economy. She notes that microenterprise
entrepreneurs face a range of market barriers that constrain the successful operation of their
businesses.
In studying the three microenterprise programs, Servon found that access to credit was not the
biggest barrier for people trying to start their own business. As a result, all programs offered a
wide range of services that are important to their success. She determined that the programs
fulfilled their intention of helping poor people. , Yet most participants did not fit the underclass
stereotype that attracts much of the media and federal attention – they were individuals who had
the means to pursue their goal of self-employment.
The microenterprise programs significantly helped participants establish valuable relationships
within the business community and with the public and nonprofit sectors. Servon concluded that
microenterprise programs help change the mindset of people by creating a forward motion,
giving them the hope they need to take charge of their own lives. While microenterprise
programs will not solve urban poverty, they provide a motivated population with services it does
not receive elsewhere.
Grueling (1987) provides an early assessment of Tax Increment Financing (TIF). His work was
based on interviews with many individuals with direct experience in the use of tax increment
financing as well as a review of a wide range of secondary materials. He found several
important advantages and disadvantages of TIF.
Among the advantages: 1) TIF can provide significant capital to some types of development
projects that are economically feasible; 2) the community (and taxing bodies) do not lose tax
revenues that were being collected prior to the development program; 3) property owners do not
pay more than the normal tax burden; 4) tax increment bonds, when used, are not counted against
the city’s bonded indebtedness; 5) development is financed from increased tax revenues the
project generates rather than tax subsidies from other areas; 6) once the project is complete and
bonds are retired, the full tax base and revenues become available to all taxing bodies; 7) because
bonds are required for most TIF projects, economic feasibility is closely scrutinized by the bond
market, and 8) in most cases, no public referendum is required of bonds issued for a TIF project.
Disadvantages include: 1) no increase in tax base until the bonds have been retired; 2) when
used, TIF or revenue bonds will be more expensive than general obligation bonds because of the
higher risk; 3) TIF has been abused – cities have created large districts in order to capture
increments not directly related to the public improvements financed; 4) without some limits (by
area or length of time to capture the increment), TIF can extend indefinitely and never return
benefits to the community; 5) when increments do not materialize other sources of revenue are
required to retire the bonds; 6) citizens have little say on the use of TIF; 7) TIFs are difficult to
use with certain development incentives a community might offer, such as tax freezes or tax
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abatements; and 8) once TIF bonds have been issued, it is hard to change development plans
because of obligations to the bond holders.
Man (2001) provides a recent literature review of TIF effects on economic development. A
survey of randomly selected municipalities found that the 78 percent of cities that reported the
use of TIF experienced increases in property values, while only 2 percent experienced a decline
(Forgery 1993). Case studies in Illinois (Davis 1989; Ritter and Oldfield 1990) and Wisconsin
(Huddleston 1984) also found that TIF projects stimulate economic development.
Using an econometric model, Anderson (1990) found that cities that had adopted TIF
experienced greater property value increases than those that did not. However, he did not address
the issue of growth induced or caused by the creation of a TIF program. Man argues that TIF’s
effectiveness, as an economic development tool, is a necessary but insufficient condition for the
policy adoption because the effectiveness criterion does not address whether the benefits
outweigh the costs to taxpayers.
Huddleston (1982) found that TIF projects in Wisconsin have a positive fiscal impact on both
sponsor and contributor governments, but the expected financial gains to the contributor
governments must be considered in the very long term. Lawrence and Stephenson (1995) found
that taxpayers in the entire metropolitan Des Moines, Iowa, subsidized downtown activities in
the early years of the TIF program. Later they experienced lower property tax rates due to the
urban economic revitalization program funded by the TIF mechanism. Man attributes the
conflicting findings about the effectiveness of TIF to the differences in uses and structures of TIF
programs among jurisdictions and the types of projects funded through TIF.
Chicago’s experience with TIF supports this argument. In 1998, city officials announced that
more than 4,400 acres (nearly 3 percent of the city’s total land area) would be designated as TIF
districts. Success in the districts has been mixed. The three districts closest to the central
business district are on track to meet their financial goals; those closer to the periphery of the city
are lagging.
Within a few years, property values and increment in an industrial TIF district near downtown
reached levels that were not expected for about 10 years. Another district, in proximity to
downtown and an expressway, has successfully attracted development and several more projects
are in the planning phase. In another part of the city, a district that once served the steel industry,
property values have continued to decline despite the TIF designation, although projects are
pending. In another district, retail activity has increased, but industrial development has been
slow to occur (Hinz 2002).
Weber (forthcoming) provides further evidence of the contradictory findings TIF success. Man
and Rosentraub (1998) found TIF had a positive effect on median housing values in Indiana;
Dardia (1998) determined that TIF had a substantial and positive impact on development in
California.
However, Dye and Merriman (2000) found a negative impact of TIF adoption on growth in
municipal-wide property values in metropolitan Chicago. They determined that TIF trades off

The Center for Economic Development, Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University

20

higher growth in the TIF district with lower growth elsewhere. Therefore, municipalities that
adopt TIF stimulate growth of blighted areas at the expense of the larger town.
Weber reports that other evidence has shown that TIF is frequently used to move existing retail
to different parts of the same region (Redfield 1995). Evaluating the success of TIF is difficult
because, like most economic development strategies, it requires an assessment of what would (or
would not) have happened if the TIF district had not been created. Further complications arise
because each state places different restrictions on the use of TIF, which makes it hard to
generalize about the success of TIF as an economic development tool.
What can be established, according to Weber, is that TIF operates well in areas where property
values are initially low relative to other parts of the municipality or are growing at a slower pace.
In these cases, the value of the property prior to development is low enough to create a
substantial increment when property values start to grow.
Weber also points out that TIF is a speculative business. It requires that municipalities finance
development based on the belief that costs can be recovered once property values increase. If
property values fail to grow at the anticipated levels, municipalities can lose.
Weber cites a case in Battle Creek, Mich., where the Downtown Development Authority
struggled to repay the debt assumed to finance development in a TIF district. She also notes that
several TIF bonds have defaulted in California and Colorado.
To prevent failure or abuse of TIF, Weber offers suggestions for reform, including more
thorough review of TIF proposals by overlapping taxing jurisdictions (taxing bodies who do not
receive the additional revenue); legislation that allows overlapping jurisdictions to recapture
some of the increased revenue that is not attributable to the new development; and a shift of
more risk to private developers.
Houstoun (1996) studied the use of business improvement districts (BIDs) as economic
development tools in several U.S. cities. He contends that BIDs have been very successful at
most of their assumedtasks and they are remarkably free of controversy.
He identified five primary reasons for the general success of BIDs: 1) there is no substitute for
the collective self-interest of business and property owners to guide economic development; 2)
for the first time, these areas have one or more professionals in charge of watching the details of
the commercial environment; 3) they offer a predictable income stream, making it possible to
plan multi-year services or infrastructure improvements; 4) because all who benefit pay, the
assessment represents a minor share of the occupancy costs; 5) BIDs operate in most cases as
nonprofit corporations, free from government rules and politics yet accountable to those they
serve.
Despite the many successes, Houstoun offers two important cautions: the public and private
partnership inherent in BIDs can sometimes lead to conflict; and BIDs face inherent conflict
because of their dual roles as marketers and measurers of economic and social conditions.
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The Center for Urban Policy Research at Rutgers University (1997) led an effort to evaluate the
Economic Development Administration (EDA) Public Works Program, which provides grants
for infrastructure improvements. The study included 205 projects that received their last
payment in fiscal year 1990. According to the researchers, the projects were completed and
structures associated with them were either occupied or soon to be occupied; therefore, at the
time of the study – six years later – they had been sufficiently established to make their
evaluation possible.
Public works projects included buildings, industrial parks, roads, water/sewer and
marine/tourism projects. They were assessed based on the number of jobs created or retained
and the amount of private and public sector funds that were leveraged. The research team found
the following direct impacts: 96 percent of the projects produced permanent jobs six years after
completion; 84 percent leveraged private sector investment; on average, each project produced
327 direct permanent jobs for every $1 million of EDA funding; $3,058 in EDA funds was spent
per job created or retained; not including public projects, for every $1 million in EDA funding,
$10.1 million was leveraged in private sector investment; for every $1 million in EDA funding,
another $1 million was leveraged in federal, state or local investment; 15 full-time construction
jobs were created per $1 million in EDA funding.
The study also identified several favorable indirect impacts related to job creation and tax
revenue. On average, there were twice as many jobs six years later then at the project’s
completion. Researchers also found that EDA public-sector economic stimuli successfully
create private-sector jobs and low levels of cost.
The study concluded that most of the public works projects achieved EDA’s objective of giving
communities the necessary framework to expand their economic base and generate jobs and
private investment in many areas that would not have experienced these benefits without EDA
assistance.
An evaluation of the Appalachian Regional Commission’s (ARC) Infrastructure and Public
Works Program (Brandow 2000) also produced positive findings. The evaluation included a
representative sample of public works projects, interviews with project managers and local
stakeholders, analysis of project outcomes and economic impacts and a baseline economic
analysis of the impact areas to assess the relative contribution of each project.
The study examined 99 projects, initiated and completed between 1990 and 1997, with $32.4
million in ARC funding. Among the projects were industrial parks and sites, water and sewer
systems, access roads and business incubators.
Researchers found that 82 percent of the projects met or exceeded expectations regarding the
number of new businesses served; 78 percent met or exceeded expectations regarding the
number of businesses retained; 72 percent met or exceeded expectations for jobs created; 82
percent met or exceeded expectations for jobs retained, and all projects met or exceeded
expectations regarding the number of new and existing households served.
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Each dollar of ARC funding helped leverage $2.62 in other public funding and each dollar of
total public funding leveraged $16.65 in private investment. Researchers estimated an increase
in state income tax revenue of $14.3 million; an increase in state/local sales tax revenue of $13.9
million; and an increase in local property tax revenue of $29.2 million. They also found that the
new jobs led to increased personal income for residents of the affected counties. All types of
projects performed well and there was some indication that the projects contributed to overall
economic improvement in the affected counties.
In general, projects put back into use sites that had been symbols of community blight. A large
number of projects were aligned with regional strategies or developed industry clusters, and
many were used to support traditional industries. Some projects addressed long-standing
infrastructure issues that met basic necessities and solved environmental problems. Local
representatives also believed many projects had indirectly improved the quality of life in the
area. ARC investments demonstrated very significant impacts on local project areas relative to
overall growth patterns-- 42 of the 76 project areas had job growth rates above the U.S. average
for that time period.
Keys to successful capital market strategies
If economic development programs that seek to affect capital markets are to be successful, they
must be able to promote or provide financing in situations where conventional lending markets
will not. Most finance programs target perceived gaps in capital markets. They should not step
into situations where conventional lenders or private investors will meet demand. Policymakers
should understand that these types of loans are associated with high levels of risk and failure.
They should be prepared to accept losses. Many studies have shown that by providing additional
services, failure rates can be reduced. While access to capital can be a problem for many start-up
businesses, they also benefit from a wide range of supportive services.
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CHAPTER FOUR: OPERATING COSTS
Efforts to reduce operating costs receive more attention than perhaps any other economic
development strategy. They are increasingly popular, yet politically controversial. As a result,
the effectiveness of incentive programs has captured the interest of many policymakers and
researchers. There have been numerous efforts to measure the impact of incentive and business
assistance programs on economic growth.
Studies that attempt to determine the efficacy of incentive programs face a difficult challenge in
isolating the effect of incentives and developing appropriate methodologies. Evaluation of
business assistance programs most often takes the form of individual case studies that assess the
effectiveness of specific programs. While this complicates generalizing findings, it assembles
valuable information about the experiences of various regions. This section concludes with an
overview of important considerations in developing programs that target cost reduction for firms.
SUBSIDIES AND INCENTIVES
Evaluating incentive packages that lure businesses into a region is a particularly difficult task.
For starters, the intraregional sample size is much too small to draw statistical inference; there
simply are not enough comparable developments in a single region to statistically determine
whether an incentive package has been effective. Secondly, it is difficult if not impossible, to
determine what might have occurred had policy not been implemented.
While this problem exists when attempting to assess the effectiveness of any economic
development strategy, it is particularly evident when considering incentive programs.
Notwithstanding the problems associated with evaluating the effectiveness of incentives,
researchers have undertaken a number of innovative approaches to measure their impact.
Surveys, regression analysis and case study analysis are among methods used to evaluate
incentives..
Surveys have been sent out to existing businesses, probing which reasons most influenced site
location. For example, Schmitt et al. (1985) surveyed 950 companies that were randomly drawn
from the membership of the Michigan Chamber of Commerce. Businesses were given a list of
34 factors that might be expected to influence a business expansion or relocation decision and
were asked to rank the importance of each.
Researchers considered only results related to a location choice among communities within a
metropolitan area. The survey found that a city’s general business climate or attitude toward
industry got top consideration. This comprehensive category encompasses the city’s fiscal,
zoning and regulatory climate, along with its propensity to “cut a break” for business. “Distance
to customers” and “cost of property” were ranked as second and third most important factors.
Ranked fourth were financial inducements.
Regression analysis offers a more objective and rigorous evaluation of the efficacy of incentives,
though it too is imperfect. Bartik (1991) undertook an extensive examination of previous
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regression studies specifically examining the influence of particular economic development
policies. He concluded that “enterprise zones, research parks, location incentives, such as
property tax abatements, and export promotion programs make some difference to state and local
economic growth.”
Referring to economic development policy broadly, he stated that competition among state and
local governments probably enhances the efficiency of the U.S. economy since the most
depressed areas will adopt more aggressive policies. This should result in a geographic
redistribution of economic activity to areas were it is most efficient.
Bartik also suggests that widespread economic development subsidies may encourage an
expansion of national employment, leading to a lower average national unemployment rate.
McHone (1984), examined 26 metropolitan areas in several states. He found that the presence of
an industrial development bond program, property tax exemptions and accelerated depreciation
of manufacturing equipment all positively influenced a county’s probability of experiencing a
competitive growth component greater than the metropolitan area’s. He also found that local
taxes, as a percentage of income, exert a statistically significant negative influence.
Anderson and Wassmer (2000) conducted a regression study on the influence of local property
tax abatements in a metropolitan area. Their findings suggest that manufacturing property tax
abatement will help to bring or retain industry, but that continuously increasing the number or
magnitude of tax abatements will not continue to help grow the manufacturing base.
However, property tax abatements are not completely beneficial. A rise in local commercial
property tax abatements decreases the value of local homes, decreases local expenditure per
capita and increases the rate of grants/user charges. Anderson and Wassmer concluded that
policymakers must also consider negative secondary effects when assessing the desirability of
local property tax abatements.
The case study approach is distinct from regression analysis and survey research, though it may
incorporate one, both, or neither into its method. Lynch, Fishgold, and Blackwook (1996)
undertook a case study to determine the effectiveness of firm-specific state tax incentives
provided by Industrial Development Agencies (IDAs) to promote economic development in New
York State. They tracked total tax costs and bonding activity of IDAs between 1987 and 1991,
showing that total tax losses exceeded $1.3 billion.
Little evidence exists that IDAs have encouraged firms to relocate to, remain in, or expand
within New York state, they concluded. Furthermore, they suggested that other states currently
employing or contemplating the use of firm-specific tax incentives to foster economic
development should consider alternative methods.
Local economic development is a highly complex matter that lacks a clear conceptual model
incorporating all of its potentially important dimensions (Smoke, 1997). The research addressing
the broad impact of business incentives on the locational decisions of firms is contradictory on
many of the most important issues; however, there has been agreement on some points.
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Many argue that public policy is a more effective instrument of economic competition within
metropolitan areas than between them, or between states or regions. (Bradbury, Kodrzycki, &
Tannenwald 1997). There is also some consensus that a stable tax system is more important to
ensure economic vitality than the availability of incentive programs.
Fisher & Peters (1997) found that incentives tend to accentuate basic tax differences, reinforcing
the view that business location decisions are motivated largely by factors other than taxation.
They suggest that small differences in labor and other costs can outweigh quite large differences
in tax costs and incentive awards.
They propose that neither tax incentives nor non-tax incentives offset the effects of the basic
state-local tax systems. This belief was echoed by Wylensko, who recommends that
policymakers “pay attention to maintaining a stable business tax system with low rates and broad
tax bases that can efficiently support the service levels preferred by businesses and residents of
the state, rather than to ad hoc ‘competitive’ tax reductions possibly accompanied by cuts in
service levels or rising deficits” (Bradbury, Kodrzycki, &Tannenwald 1997).
Researchers have also cautioned planners about the use of tax incentive programs. First, tax
incentives may foster development by reducing business costs, but they can indirectly impede
development if they reduce expenditures on public services that businesses value. (Bradbury,
Kodrzycki &Tannenwald 1997). Second, it may be unrealistic to expect incentive programs to
lead to job creation.
Fisher and Peters refer to the work of Netzer, who pointed out that economic development
incentives generally reduce the cost of capital rather than labor, yet believes it is unlikely that the
reduction in the cost of capital will lead to employment increases. Instead, Netzer asserted, we
should expect some substitution of capital for labor, given that “the new capital induced by cheap
credit or state corporate tax credits is likely to be largely exempt from local property taxes, it
may be no great success from a local standpoint if the labor intensity of a new plant is quite low
(often the case with the more spectacular industrial development bond issues of past decades).
So it is important to distinguish between capital and labor subsidies.” (Fisher & Peters 1997).
The inconsistent findings regarding the effectiveness of incentives can also be seen in studies of
enterprise zones. A majority of states have adopted enterprise zone legislation and several
evaluations have been conducted to study the usefulness of this strategy. Because enterprise
zones generally employ a number of incentives, they add to the body of literature assessing the
value of incentives in promoting economic growth. In most cases, researchers found the benefits
to be modest at best.
Dabney (1991) studied enterprise zones in eight states. He determined that tax incentives were
often offset by higher economic costs such as insurance, transportation and access to raw
materials. The only significant change was for small independent firms and firms in a few
specific industries.
However, there was no significant difference in the rate of growth among those or other
classifications in the zones when compared to the city as a whole. Furthermore, Dabney reported
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that the impact of incentives on business locations was marginal except in those cases where the
value of the incentive is large relative to the amount of investment. As a result, small businesses
were most attracted to enterprise zones.
He suggested that the typical enterprise zone program consisting of limited tax incentives and
regulatory relief is unable, by itself, to address adequately the necessary factors found to be
important in most business location decisions. Dabney concluded that enterprise zone incentives
are unlikely to make up for the significant locational disadvantages presented by inner-city
enterprise zones.
Wilder and Rubin (1996) examined 21 studies that covered enterprise zone programs across the
country. They found little evidence of program success, but point to scant research on the effect
that land use and community planning has on the success of geographically targeted economic
development programs. They suggest that the lack of effective planning may be an important
missing element in enterprise zone programs.
Boarnet and Bogart (1996) studied New Jersey’s enterprise zone program and found no evidence
of job growth or increased real estate value attributable to the program. One study, conducted by
Sridhar (1996), reported large net benefits for a sample of 68 enterprise zones in Illinois.
However, her conclusions were criticized because her research assumed that program incentives
were responsible for all employment generated in the zones (McDonald 1997).
Dowall (1996) analyzed 13 zones in California between 1986 and 1990. Using shift-share
analysis, he found that virtually all of the actual employment growth over the time period could
be explained by countywide growth and industrial mix components. In fact, Dowall concludes,
after these two factors are accounted for, the total residual-effect component for the 13 zones was
negative.
Dowall summarizes his assessment of enterprise zone programs as having produced modest
economic benefits and concludes that there is little evidence to suggest they have strengthened
the economic advantages of economically sluggish neighborhoods.
A recent study of Louisville’s enterprise zone (Lambert & Coomes 2001) further supports the
argument that zones offer limited benefits. The study found little evidence of either economic or
neighborhood revitalization benefits that could be attributed to the enterprise zone program.
Lambert and Coomes estimated that a minimum of $55 million in forgone tax revenue and fees
and administrative costs was attributable to the program, but the number of jobs and employed
residents within the zone actually fell even as the rest of the county experienced growth in both
measures. While they admit being unable to determine precisely the costs and benefits of the
enterprise zone program, they believe the benefits have been modest while the costs have been
significant.
Tannery (1998) studied the effect of the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) on the earnings and
labor force participation of welfare recipients and disadvantaged youths. The TJTC granted the
employer of an eligible worker a tax credit equal to 40 percent of the worker’s wages in the first
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year of employment or $2,400 per employee, whichever was less. Workers were eligible if they
belonged to one of several groups, such as welfare recipients and youths aged 18 to 22 from
economically disadvantaged families.
These two groups account for about 80 percent of the available data and therefore served as the
focus of Tannery’s study. The analysis was based on 17,000 workers in Pennsylvania. He
compared their earnings with individuals who applied for the program and therefore had similar
circumstances, but were denied participation because of paperwork or other application
problems.
Tannery found that eligible workers--welfare recipients and disadvantaged youths alike--accrued
substantial earnings gains. Moreover, the cumulative income gains to program participants
exceeded the $2,400 maximum per worker cost of the program. His results also suggested that
certified workers were more likely to be employed than those in the uncertified comparison
group; the greater on-the-job experience attributable to the subsidized employment explained at
least part of the earnings differential.
Tannery determined that the earnings differential remained after the program ended, providing
evidence that the program’s gains are long-term. Critics allege the TJTC program did little to
create jobs because workers were certified after being hired. Tannery responds that the program
incites employers to lengthen the tenure of otherwise short-term jobs.

BUSINESS ASSISTANCE
Sherman & Chappell (1998) focused on the effectiveness of business incubators. They convened
and surveyed three focus groups of incubator managers, stakeholders and incubator graduate
firms, and employed additional methodological techniques. Their results indicated that business
incubators can be an effective economic development tool and have the potential for positive
impact on the community through job creation and help for new business survival and growth.
Nevertheless, in a response article to the Sherman and Chappell conclusion, Bearse (1998)
criticized the methodology employed, stressing that 40 of the 50 incubators analyzed still had not
been able to break even. Bearse asserted that the research had failed to deliver, or help others to
produce, valid performance evaluations, performance benchmarking results and management
information that can help incubators attain financial self-sustainability.
Case studies have also been employed in order to evaluate the economic and fiscal impacts of
business incubators. In general, these studies measured impacts by examining such factors as
jobs created by incubator tenants and graduates, product innovation, number of new business
starts, success rates of incubator firms, and location in the incubator service area after
graduation.
Job creation per incubator firm was found to be relatively small—fewer than 10 employees—but
tended to increase over time. Some suggest that incubators are best viewed as a long-term
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economic development strategy, keeping in mind both short- and long-run impacts. (Markley &
McNamara, 1995).
Markely & McNamara conducted a case study of the efficacy of a business incubator in the
center of a small metropolitan area. They concluded that incubators were effective in generating
jobs and income, especially by creating linkages with firms inside and outside the local economy
over the long run. Thus, research using both case studies and surveys has produced mixed
results regarding the effectiveness of business incubators as economic development tools.
The New York Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) was established to help small and
medium-sized manufacturers in the state compete more effectively by providing a range of
services to assist in modernization. Evaluators of New York’s MEP relied on quasi-experimental
design to compare the performance of MEP clients with that of similar, non-participating
companies. They found that, on average, participating companies changed important business
and manufacturing processes, improved manufacturing performance and increased value added.
They estimate significant public sector benefits including an additional $30 to $110 million of
value-added income. This represents a net benefit to the state economy, since all costs incurred
in implementing the changes were captured in the calculations. They also estimated that between
510 and 1,920 jobs were created in a two-year period. A cost-benefit analysis was not
conducted. (Oldsman & Heye n.d.)
Pennsylvania’s Industrial Resource Centers (IRC) program was established to help small- and
medium-sized manufactures upgrade business practices and modernize their production
capabilities to spur economic growth in the state. IRC staff helps companies assess their overall
and specific business operations, identify areas for improvement, define a course of action and
marshal resources required to make the needed changes.
Evaluation based on a comparison of participating companies and similar non-participating
companies demonstrated that IRC clients increased labor productivity and contributed to an
increase in gross state product. Researchers estimated that the program was directly responsible
for $120 million in additional state revenue and the return on state investment was 22 to 1
(Nexus Associates 1999).
Jarmin (1999) analyzed data from eight manufacturing extension centers in two states to evaluate
the impact of services on productivity. He compared growth in productivity among firms that
received services between 1987 and 1992 to that of a control group that did not receive services.
He found that clients experienced between 3.4 and 16 percent more growth in labor productivity
than non-clients.
Feldman and Kelley (2002) examined the role played by state programs in the development of
technology pioneering firms (defined as new companies formed to commercialize new
technologies). Their work relied on in-depth case studies of four companies that were award
winners in the highly selective competitions of the Advanced Technology Program of the
National Institute for Standards and Technology.
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Feldman and Kelley identified three types of programs that states use to augment the capabilities
of new companies. They include university-based, technology-assistance programs (technology
transfer programs, applied research grants and facilities and access to resources); financial
assistance programs (public venture capital funds and matching funds for federal research
grants); and business assistance programs (incubation facilities and assistance in developing
business plans).
The researchers found that the companies studied were successful in obtaining funding from
public and private sources and in developing a technology of proven valuable to other
organizations. State programs were instrumental to their success. All the companies relied on
the resources of universities and received subsidies from the states to help support their research
activities. States also made equity investments directly in the firms. Feldman and Kelley contend
that the financial return on these investments may provide important benefits to the state. They
suggest that focusing on employment gains is a shortsighted method to measure success.
Pennsylvania created the Ben Franklin Partnership (BPF) to promote technological innovation.
A program evaluation included in-depth case studies, client-reported impacts and estimates of
value added, employment and tax revenues generated by the program.
The case studies indicated that BFP played a critical role in the early stages of company
development by supplying financing and technical expertise. The program produced an
estimated 21,800 additional jobs in client firms over a seven-year period, jobs that paid an annual
salary approximately 45 percent higher than the average salary statewide.
Evaluators also estimated that the program led to the creation of an additional 24,500 jobs with
non-client firms due to ripple effects. The boost to the Pennsylvania economy was calculated to
be $2.9 billion over seven years. The rate of return was $14 dollars for every $1 of public
investment and the state collected an additional $168 million in tax revenues. Overall, evaluators
determined that clients developed new products, built management teams, established production
capacity, identified new markets and increased their sales and profitability as a result of the
program (Nexus Associates n.d.).
Ohio’s seven Edison Centers are located throughout the state. Each center offers different
services directed at industries of particular strength in their region. Austrian and Wolf (1999)
studied 1,527 projects undertaken by the Edison Centers to assess their economic impact. They
found that participating firms realized cost savings of $296.9 million and increased sales by
$708.8 million during the 1994-1998-study period. They estimated centers created 4,628 jobs
per year in Ohio and disposable income increased by $195 million annually. In addition, an
average of $262 million in goods and services were produced as a result of the centers’ activities.
The Economic Development Administration (U.S. Department of Commerce) administers the
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program, designed to assist manufacturing firms adversely
affected by increased international trade. The program pays for technical assistance to firms that
have experienced declining sales and employment due to competition from imported goods.
Assistance may include plant layout, management information systems, human resources and
marketing and promotion.
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An evaluation conducted by the Urban Institute (1998) compared changes in employment and
sales for companies assisted by TAA Centers to changes for companies that were determined
eligible for assistance, but declined to participate in the program. They found that assisted
companies had higher survival rates than unassisted companies (83.8 percent versus 70.7
percent); had added employees (4.2 percent, on average) while unassisted companies showed
employment losses (5.3 percent); and experienced stronger sales growth (33.9 percent) than
unassisted companies (16.2 percent).
Researchers estimated that $87 in sales was generated for each dollar invested through the
program. The differences in sales, employment and survival were attributed to six factors: 1) a
fairly extensive package of assistance, implemented at low cost to the firm; 2) the willingness of
firms to “select-into” the program by investing time and money in their own recovery; the efforts
of TAA Center directors to target firms that, although declining, remain strong enough to benefit
from aid; 3) emphasis on a complete and unbiased “diagnostic” of firm strengths and weakness;
4) reliance on private consultants selected through a competitive and project-specific approach
to ensure a good fit between firm needs and provider response; 5) strong company interest in full
cooperation during implementation because it put up cash and was involved in joint selection of
the consultants with the TAA Center; and 6) flexibility for companies to sequence
implementation tasks consistent with their own needs and ability to use staff rather than the
providers’ timetable for training courses or staff availability
Despite the successes, the researchers also noted several areas of concern: 1) few firms eligible
for assistance actually receive it; 2) not all trade-impacted firms are eligible for assistance; 3) a
substantial backlog in delivering technical assistance; 4) 55 percent of TAA funding covers the
cost of technical assistance to firms (while much of the remaining portion covers costs associated
with the elaborate process of determining eligibility); 5) a time lag in getting assistance to firms;
6) cost share and fee policies across TAA Centers are inconsistent; and 7) TAA Centers tend not
to leverage other business assistance services.
The evaluators made six recommendations to address these issues: 1) modify the program to
make it more effective, but allow it to remain as a stand-alone (oppose efforts for program
consolidation); 2) eliminate or improve the certification process (eligibility determination); 3)
improve the diagnostic process; 4) achieve better leverage of technical assistance; 5) improve the
quality of program evaluations (of individual TAA centers); and 6) streamline the national
program management

Keys to successful incentive and business assistance programs
To help ensure accountability, Ledebur & Woodward (1990) suggest that provisions of incentive
packages be tied to financial recourse should a firm fail to meet negotiated performance
standards. They cite several examples of firms that received generous incentives and soon
thereafter shut down or scaled back operations.

The Center for Economic Development, Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University

30

They also offer development officials a list of steps they can take should a firm not comply with
an agreement. Among the steps are recalibrating subsidy schedules in light of weak or strong
performance, reclaiming all or part of a subsidy and penalizing firms by collecting the original
unpaid taxes along with interest charges.
Included in guidelines urged by Waits & Heffernon (1994) are: incentives linked to quality jobs
and advancement opportunities; encouraging recipient companies to fill a certain percentage of
new jobs with local people; linking incentives to company investments in technology and human
resource development; encouraging companies to offer health care insurance for all employees;
insisting that strong environmental management and compliance records be kept; targeting
companies important to key clusters, and analyzing the costs and benefits of all incentives
packages to ensure the best decision possible.
Friedmand (1994) points out that incentives may be structured to further the goals of public
policy. For instance, “linked deposit” programs entail depositing funds in banks that commit to
lending money at a favorable rate to small businesses, high-tech companies, minority- and
woman-owned firms and other targeted companies.
Firms that bring energy-efficient technologies to market, for example, would be given preference
for incentives under such a philosophy. These are just a few examples of new ideas that have
come from the research. The literature abounds with creative ideas, strategies and principles for
making incentives work as economic development tools.
Bartik points to the valuable role public agencies can have in assisting businesses by making
information available. He says: “Government information provision programs will be most
effective when they complement rather than substitute for privately-produced information.
Obviously there is much private production of information to businesses from consultants and
other sources. Government information provision should include the basic information that is
least likely to be optimally provided by the private sector” (Bartik 1990).
Bartik also recognizes that situations come up when government agencies simply have better
access to information, such as tax rates, regulations and public services. In these cases, it is
certainly appropriate for the public sector to assist business by supplying needed information.
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WHAT WORKS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE? AN EVALUATION OF STRATEGIES AND TOOLS
Areas of Intervention

Examples

Type of Evaluation /
Measures

Results

Lessons Learned / Caveats

Subsidizing new innercity housing in Cleveland,
Ohio.
Downtown revitalizations
efforts (eight projects)

Compared fiscal costs and fiscal
benefits to the city.

Cost-benefit ratio of 2:1.
New housing starts were generated.

Intangible benefits are excluded.

Measured differences in business
profile and growth trends
between downtown
improvement zone, rest of
downtown and other retail
districts in central city.

Significant variation in impact, from
large new entry and growth of existing
business to continued exit from the
area. Larger impact on entry than
expansion.

Revitalization of innercity commercial and
industrial district:
MidTown Initiative in
Cleveland, Ohio.

Measures included changes in
property’s assessed values;
number of new companies;
number of expansions; job
creation and retention.

Research Triangle Park
and research parks
nationwide

Case study of RTP and analysis
of research park success
nationally.

Jacob Javits Convention
Center in New York City

Visitors, state and local taxes,
spin-off development.

Indianapolis Sports
Strategy for downtown
development

Employment and payroll trends
in Indianapolis compared to
other regions.

Over a 15-year period, assessed values
of properties increased (55 percent for
commercial and 47 percent for
industrial). There were 425 new
companies, 400 business expansions,
5,500 new jobs and 6,000 jobs
retained.
While RTP was responsible for a
considerable amount of technologyrelated employment in the region, most
businesses were attracted by the
proximity of the three research
universities. Overall, many research
parks fail and many of those that
succeed do so only as more general
business parks.
Center created an economic impact of
$2 billion from 1.5 million annual outof-town attendees. State and local
taxes generated more than operating
cost and debt service, when the old
center is not taken into account.
Javits Center did not lead to physical
revitalization in the immediate area.
Employment growth rates in
downtown Indianapolis were not
higher than in other Midwestern areas.
It did not result in higher paying jobs.

Variation in retail and service activity
reflects health of regional economy and
relative importance of downtown as a
commercial center. Successful projects
required additional improvements, such
as transit service, street and sidewalk
maintenance and sponsored activities.
Private sector can mobilize its economic
power to increase inner-city competitive
advantage. Public relations and
marketing programs are required.

LAND
Market Rate Housing
Business Site Location

Physical Amenities
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Cannot compare to trends in
Indianapolis that might have occurred
without the sports strategy.
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WHAT WORKS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE? AN EVALUATION OF STRATEGIES AND TOOLS
Areas of Intervention

Examples

Type of Evaluation /
Measures

Results

National Jobs Corps Program

Employment, earnings, crime
and cost-benefit analysis.

Employment and earning gains across
most students. Reduction in crime. Cost
effective despite high initial costs.
Stimulate student interest.
Useful contacts with employers.
More students plan for post-secondary
training.
Positive results: higher GPA, lower
dropout rates and higher probability to
attend postsecondary education.
Negative results: no higher employment
rates or wages after high school
graduation.
Positive results: Higher GPA, higherclass rank, reduction in absence, higher
employment rates, higher wage rates, and
higher number of hours worked.
75 percent of participants were employed.
However, only 6 0 percent of employed
participants were in jobs related to
training.
A year of schooling raised long-term
earnings of displaced workers by 5
percent. Technically oriented courses had
large returns while other courses resulted
in zero or negative returns.
Programs lead to increased earnings and
the benefits generally outweigh the costs,
though the increases in earnings are
moderate and benefits usually fade out
after a few years.
Training programs produce modest
positive effects on employment and
earnings for adults, but are not large
enough reduce poverty, income inequality
or welfare use. Programs have not
produced positive effects for youth.

Lessons Learned / Caveats

LABOR
Industry/Occupation Specific
Training

School-to-work programs

High School Career Academy
(a study of 10,000 students)

Compared program
participants to a comparison
group.

School-to-Work by
Michigan’s Manufacturing
Technology Partnership

Compared program
participants to a comparison
group. Preparation for careers
in manufacturing.
Used survey to determine
employment and wages.

Work force development
programs (for adults)
administered by the Ohio
Department of Education
Community College impact
on displaced workers in
Pennsylvania and
Washington

Data analysis from
unemployment insurance
earnings records and college
transcripts

Federal job training programs

Reviewed a large number of
evaluation studies conducted
previously.

Government job training
programs

Reviewed a large number of
evaluation studies conducted
previously.

The Center for Economic Development, Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University

Difficult to get postsecondary
institutions and employers
involved; there are costs in being a
worksite for students.
Factors contributing to success:
complete curriculum, sheltered
environment, social support system
of teachers and peers, leadership,
and school system and community
support.
Program successfully implemented
a dynamic curriculum integrating
vocational and academic skills.
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Areas of Intervention

Examples

Type of Evaluation /
Measures

Results

Lessons Learned / Caveats

Government job training
programs for disadvantaged
women

Compared recipients of job
training to a comparison group
without job training.

Helping disadvantaged women
requires micro-level as well as
macro-level intervention. Macrolevel interventions include policies
that encourage occupational and
educational opportunities and
effective welfare systems.

Resource networks for lowincome women

Interviews with adult female
welfare recipients.

Overall, job training had little or no effect
on the probability of working. Women
who received more than one type of job
training were more successful. Training
recipients received higher wages.
Contextual and structural factors had
important impacts.
The most useful type of networks are
wide acquaintanceship networks from
work and school that emerge from human
capital development. Social contacts can
prevent women from competing
successfully in the primary labor market.
Wage subsidies may be the most effective
policy for job-mobile women.
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WHAT WORKS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE? AN EVALUATION OF STRATEGIES AND TOOLS
Areas of Intervention

Examples

Type of Evaluation /
Measures

Results

Using Industrial Revenue
Bonds (IRBs) in Illinois

Based on interviews with a
sample of IRB recipients.

Venture capital role in
technological innovation and
economic development

Developed a database on the
venture capital industry over four
years; tested statistical
relationships; interviewed people
involved in venture capital
industry.

For recipients: employment grew by
48 percent; 45 percent of
employment growth was in high
wage, professional and skilled
occupations; profits increased by 54
percent; and minorities and women
constituted majority of work force.
Venture capital (VC) is very
concentrated in the Northeast and
Pacific regions. VC investments
flow mainly to established hightechnology centers. VC is only one
element of an area’s technology base.

Importance of locally
managed venture capital funds
in St. Louis

Reviewed performance of three
locally managed funds.

Capital Access Program
(CAP), Michigan

Analyzed the Michigan CAP
Program. CAP provides bank a
partial loan loss reserve to absorb
higher risk.

Revolving Loan Fund (RLF)
in Auburn, Alabama

Case study identified how to
operate a successful RLF.
Evaluation based on creation and
retention of jobs, economic
vitality, tax benefits, leverage
ratios and availability of funds.

RLF promoted job development; no
defaults on RLF loans; tax impact of
$150 million annually; leverage
ratios of public to private dollars
invested ranged from 1:3.18 to 1:
5.36.

Loan guarantee program

Study of California firms that
received loan guarantees from the
state.

Firms receiving loan guarantees
generated more than double the
number of jobs than comparable
firms in the state. Tax revenues
generated by firms exceeded program
costs.

Lessons Learned / Caveats

CAPITAL
Finance

Local VC funds financed new and
expanding local businesses. Local
VC funds provided financing when
funds managed elsewhere were not
willing to fund.
CAP was effective in providing loans
to new and small firms.
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Venture capitalists find investment
opportunities. Study did not find
gaps of venture capital due to
imperfect markets. Venture capital
is just one of many necessary inputs
to technology-intensive economic
development.

CAP loan recipients’ characteristics:
Small firms, less than five years old,
most incurred substantial debt,
needing less than $100,000 in loans,
provided collateral smaller than
required for a conventional loan.
Guidelines for local governments:
city should not be the sole investor;
private sector’s investment should
exceed that of the local government;
have a secure collateral; use sound
business principles; and isolate
decisions on deal’s value from
political interest.
Loan guarantees are a cost-effective
tool to support small business
expansion and retention.
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Areas of Intervention

Examples

Type of Evaluation /
Measures

Results

Lessons Learned / Caveats

Microenterprise programs in
three inner-city areas

In-depth study of three programs:
Women’s Initiative for SelfEmployment in San Francisco,
Working Capital in Boston and
Accion New York in Brooklyn.

Self-employment is an important
segment of the economy.
Microenterprise entrepreneurs face
market barriers.

Tax Increment Financing
(TIF)

Broad literature review and case
analysis.

Access to credit was not the largest
barrier. All programs offered other
services. Programs helped
participants establish relationships
with the business, public and
nonprofit sectors.
Mixed results on the success of TIF.
Has shown positive impact on
property values and development, but
can also stimulate growth in blighted
areas at the expense of other areas.

Tax Increment Financing in
Chicago

Review of several TIF districts in
City of Chicago.

Business Improvement
Districts (BIDs)

Tool examined in several cities.

Public Works Grant Program

Reviewed 205 projects funded by
the Economic Development
Administration (EDA).

Infrastructure and Public
Works Grant Program

Reviewed 99 projects funded by
the Appalachian Regional
Commission (ARC).

Mixed results on the ability of TIF to
spur development. More success
with districts close to the central
business district.
BIDs are mostly successful. Interests
of local business owners guide
economic development; they watch
over their commercial environment; a
predictable income stream allows for
planning of multi-year services; all
beneficiaries pay; and assessment
accounts for a small share of
occupancy costs.
Most projects helped communities
expand their economic base, and jobs
and attract private investment. For
every $1 million in EDA funding,
$10.1 million was leveraged in
private sector investment, and
another $1 million was leveraged in
federal, state or local investment.
Most projects met or exceeded
expectations regarding the number of
new businesses served or retained,
and jobs created or retained. Each
dollar of ARC funding helped
leverage $2.62 in other public
funding and each dollar of total
public funding leveraged $16.65 in
private investment.
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There are risks associated with TIF.
Works best in heavily blighted
areas. Differences in uses and
structures of TIF programs among
jurisdictions and in the types of
projects funded through TIF lead to
mixed results.

BIDS operate as nonprofits and are
accountable to those they serve.
Caveats: public and private
partnerships inherent in BIDs can
lead to conflict; there is a conflict in
the role of BIDS as marketers and as
measurer of economic and social
conditions.
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WHAT WORKS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE? AN EVALUATION OF STRATEGIES AND TOOLS
Areas of Intervention

Examples

Type of Evaluation /
Measures

Results

Incentives’ role in site
location

Survey of 950 Michigan
companies. Companies chosen
randomly from a membership
database of the Michigan Chamber
of Commerce.
Reviewed regression studies.

Among 34 factors affecting location
decision, the highest ranked was the
city’s general business climate and
attitude towards industry. Financial
inducements were ranked fourth.
Location incentives, such as property
tax abatement, make some difference to
state and local economic growth. Also,
subsidies may encourage an expansion
of national employment.
Tax abatement on manufacturing
property helps recruit or retain business
but increasing the number or magnitude
of the abatement will not continue to
grow the manufacturing base.
Incentives accentuate basic tax
differences. Small differences in labor
and other costs outweigh large
differences in taxes and incentives.
Total tax losses exceeded $1.3 billion.
Little evidence to suggest IDAs
encourage firms to relocate, remain or
expand within the state.
Tax incentives were offset by higher
costs, including insurance,
transportation and access to raw
materials. No significant change in
growth rates in zones in comparison to
the city as a whole.
Found little evidence of program
success.

Lessons Learned / Caveats

OPERATING COSTS
Subsidies and Incentives

Incentives’ role in site
location

Influence of property tax
abatements

Regression study.

Incentives’ role in site
location

Hypothetical firm model.

Effectiveness of firmspecific incentives provided
by Industrial Development
Agencies (IDAs) in NY
Enterprise zones (in eight
states)

Case study of IDAs’ bonding
activities between 1987 and 1991.

Enterprise zones programs

Review of 21 studies covering
enterprise zones programs across
the country.
Case study examining changes in
employment and real estate value.
Study of 68 enterprise zones

Enterprise zone program in
New Jersey
Enterprise zones in Illinois

Comparison of enterprise zone to
the city in which it is located.

No evidence of job growth or increased
real estate values.
Large net benefits.
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Competition among state and local
governments may enhance the
efficiency of the U.S. economy.
Tax abatements have negative
secondary effects including decline in
value of local homes, declining
government expenditures per capita,
and increase in rate of user charges.
Neither tax incentives nor non-tax
incentives offset the effects of the
basic state-local tax systems
States considering the use of firmspecific tax incentives to spur
economic growth and create jobs
should look for other methods.
By itself, a typical enterprise zone is
unable to adequately provide the
necessary factors for business growth.
The impact of zone incentives on
location was only significant for small
businesses.
Lack of effective planning may be an
important missing element in
enterprise zone programs.
Caveat: study assumed that all
employment generated in the zones
was attributable to program incentives.
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Areas of Intervention

Business Assistance

Examples

Type of Evaluation /
Measures

Results

Enterprise zones in
California. Performance of
13 zones between 1986 and
1990.

Study used a shift-share analysis of
employment changes.

Enterprise zone in
Louisville

Examined forgone tax and
employment changes

Targeted Jobs Tax Credit

Comparison of earnings and labor
force participation of program
participants and a comparable
group.

Business Incubators;
analysis of 50 incubators

Focus groups of incubator
managers, stakeholders and
graduate firms.

Business incubators

Case study measured job creation,
product innovation, new business
starts and local location after
graduation.
Evaluation conducted by a quasiexperimental design comparing
performance of MEP clients with
similar companies.

All employment growth is explained by
countywide growth and industrial mix.
There is little evidence that the
enterprise zones strengthened
economically sluggish neighborhoods.
Significant costs and modest benefits.
Number of jobs and number of
employed zone residents fell, although
the rest of the county experienced
growth.
Found substantial earnings gains for
participants and gains exceeded
program costs. Participants more likely
to be employed and evidence suggested
gains are long-term.
Business incubators are an effective
educational tool; they assist new
business survival and growth and create
jobs.
Job creation per firm is small (10), but
increased over time.

Assistance to small and
medium- size manufacturers
in New York; the New York
Manufacturing Extension
Partnership (MEP)
Assistance to small and
medium-size manufacturers
in Pennsylvania;
Pennsylvania’s Industrial
Resource Centers (IRCs)
Assistance to small and
medium-size companies;
Ohio Edison Technology
Centers

Evaluation based on comparing
participating companies and
similar firms.
Economic impact analysis of over
1,500 projects undertaken by seven
centers over the 1994-98 period.
Measures include client-company
cost savings, employment gains
and increased sales.

Participating companies changed
important business and manufacturing
processes, improved performance and
increased value added. Over a two-year
period, 510-1,920 jobs were created
and additional $30-110 million of value
added was created.
IRC clients increased labor productivity
and contributed to an increase in gross
state product. IRC added $120 million
to state revenues. IRC return on state
investment was 22:1.
Participating firms realized $297
million of cost savings and increased
sales of $709 million due to
improvement associated with the
centers. The centers created 4,628 jobs
in Ohio and disposable income
increased by $195 million annually.
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Lessons Learned / Caveats

Unable to precisely determine costs
and benefits of the program.

Criticism: Most incubators are not
financially self-sustaining. 40 of the
50 incubators analyzed did not break
even.
Incubators are long-term economic
development strategy. Evaluations
should address both short- and longrun impacts.

Analysis conducted on all centers
combined. Centers are located
throughout the state and each assists
different industries.
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Areas of Intervention

Examples

Type of Evaluation /
Measures

Results

Lessons Learned / Caveats

State support of technology
pioneering firms

In-depth case studies of four
companies.

Promotion of technological
innovation in Pennsylvania;
the Ben Franklin
Partnership (BPF)

Evaluation based on in-depth case
studies; client-reported impact; and
estimates of value added,
employment and tax revenues
generated by the program.

Financial return on equity investments
may provide important benefits to the
state. Focusing on employment gains
is a shortsighted method to measure
success.
BFP is critical in the early stages of
company development by providing
financing and technical expertise.
Clients developed new products, built
management teams, developed
production capacity, identified new
markets and increased sales and
profitability.

Trade Adjustment
Assistance Program (TAA),
administered by The
Economic Development
Administration of the U.S.
Department of Commerce

Evaluation compared changes in
employment and sales for
companies assisted by TAA
centers to changes in eligible
companies that declined TAA
assistance.

The companies were successful and
state programs were instrumental to
their success by subsidizing their use of
university resources and making direct
equity investments.
Over a seven-year period, BFP resulted
in 21,800 additional jobs in client
firms, with jobs paying salaries 45
percent higher than the average state
salary. Additional 24,500 jobs were
created throughout the economy. The
state collected additional $168 million
in tax revenues. Rate of return was $14
for every one dollar of public
investment.
Benefits for assisted companies
include: higher survival rates (84
percent versus 71 percent), added
employment (4.2 percent versus decline
of 5.3 percent), sales growth (34
percent versus 16 percent). For each
dollar invested through TAA, $87 in
sales was generated.

The Center for Economic Development, Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University

Program success is due to: extensive
assistance at a low cost to firm,
participating firms investing their own
money and time in their recovery,
program provided analysis of firm’s
strengths and weaknesses. Caveats:
Too much of TAA budget is spent on
eligibility versus assistance and there
is a long backlog in getting assistance.
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